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Abstract: This article aims at contributing to governance conceptualization and its 
application to case study analyses. Two of the challenges which the theoretical and 
empirical work in the article addresses concern the facilitation of comparability of 
diverse governance cases and a specification of several key mechanisms of governance 
formation and reform. A proposed model of the architecture of governance systems 
– their major components and inter-linkages – contributes, as argued and illustrated 
here, to greater comparability among cases and with the possibility of improved 
accumulation of knowledge about governance systems. These tools are applied to 
empirical cases of governance structure and their functioning and reformation. Baltic 
fisheries, a complex, multi-level case of commons governance, is considered in some 
detail in order to illustrate and elaborate the key factors of power, knowledge, and 
conflict in the functioning and transformation of governance systems. In addition 
to the Baltic fisheries case, we consider briefly for comparative purposes chemicals 
and gender relations as additional areas of EU governance. The paper is divided 
into four sections. Section I introduces the basic conceptualization and tools of 
analysis. Section II presents the case of Baltic fisheries. Section III elaborates the 
key concepts and tools presented in Section I, in particular considering additional 
cases of the functioning of governance systems. Section IV is a brief conclusion.
Keywords: Baltic fisheries, commons, conflict, governance, governance 
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1. Introduction
Students of governance require tools to allow systematic analysis and comparability 
of diverse governance systems. In spite of a great deal of excellent research on 
governance, in particular commons governance,1 and numerous excellent case 
studies, there remain gaps and challenges. One of these gaps, which our theoretical 
and empirical research tries to address, concern the facilitation of comparability 
of governance cases.  In this article, we suggest a framework for the analysis 
of the architecture of governance systems – their major components and inter-
linkages. This conceptual tool contributes to greater comparability among cases 
and better accumulation of knowledge about commons governance systems and 
their functioning. The article presents the tools (Section I) and applies them to the 
empirical case of fisheries governance in the Baltic Sea (Section II), bringing out 
selected features of social organizational and the cognitive-normative components 
characterizing the case. In our comparative analysis (Section III), we focus in 
addition to the Baltic fisheries [a classic common pool resource (CPR)], on 
chemicals and gender relations as additional areas of EU commons governance.2
2. Basic concepts
2.1. Governance
Governance refers to a system of public and/or private coordinating, steering and 
regulatory processes established and conducted for social (or collective) purposes 
1
 The term “commons” describes goods that are shared among a well or ill-defined group of actors and 
provide some kind of yield. Commons can, but by no means have to, be open access resources. Ostrom 
and others distinguish public goods and common pool resources (CPRs) depending on whether or not 
the yield is subtractable (Ostrom 2005, 24). As other environmental resources such as water, air or 
grazing land, the fisheries case in this paper is a classic example of a CPR. Ostrom has also expanded 
the CPR concept to cover, for example, knowledge and information (Hess and Ostrom 2006).
2
 Chemistry and gender do not fall within the CPR conception but can be considered public goods. The 
governance of chemicals concerns protecting the global commons of human health and ecosystems. 
The governance of gender concerns obviously multiple values. It relates to the realization of a just and 
democratic society. While the human population is more than a “public good” or a “valued natural 
resource,” its protection and sustainability are worthy of public policy: and women in particular, their 
conditions in education systems, on labor markets, and in health care systems as well as their empower-
ment in general – are essential to the global commons of humanity and a worthy focus of governance. 
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where powers are distributed among multiple agents, according to formal and 
informal rules (Burns and Flam 1987; Ostrom et al. 1994).3 Governance systems 
are developed and applied to a vast array of objects in modern society, for purposes 
of shaping, governing, and regulating such objects.
Governance systems are the basis on which to make as well as reform, interpret, 
implement, and enforce rules and policies with respect to domains of policy and 
regulation in social life. The agents – both directing governance systems as well as 
subject to them – may be diverse: “political actors” (parties, states, international 
government organs), economic interests (private companies, business alliances 
and associations), non-profit organizations, NGOs, groups and associations of 
scientists and other experts, local communities, networks, or any social entity that 
conducts activities of deciding, governing, coordinating, regulating, allocating 
resources, etc. 
Given the contrasting objects of regulation systems (and the diversity of human 
behaviour and the material and socio-cultural contexts related to the objects of 
governance), it is not surprising that the governance arrangements exhibit great 
variability, in particular in their specific relation(s) to the objects of regulation.4 
In governance processes, operations are carried out not only on the objects to be 
regulated but also on the actors in the governance structure who are to perform 
the functions of governing, regulating, and developing. Regulation typically 
extends also to those who receive or use the objects (e.g. goods and services) of 
governance systems.
2.2. Toward a conceptualization of the architecture and functioning  
of governance systems
2.2.1. The architecture of governance systems
Governance systems – and their policy goals and tools – are institutional and 
cultural arrangements characterized by (see Table 1) (Carson et al. 2009):5 
3
 The concept of governance (Ostrom 1990; Campbell et al. 1991; Kooiman 1993; Marks et al. 
1996; Glasbergen et al. 2007; Jordan et al. 2010; McGinnis 2010 among others) has been articulated 
since the 1980s necessitated by the emergence of many private and hybrid forms of coordination and 
regulation in contemporary society. 
4
 Governance design and functioning take into account or reflect characteristics of the governance 
objects and their environmental context. Thus, a governance institution combines (“composes” if you 
will) social structural “facts” with material “facts” (human biology, environment, time and space, 
“natural” conditions) – with their different types of causality and “logics”. This is apparent in the case 
of socio-technical systems; for example, in the case of a hydro-power system, diverse but more or 
less integrated governance arrangements deal with water reservoirs and flows, land, people, electric-
ity production and distribution – the different governance sub-systems have varying social organiza-
tion, expertise, and problem-solving models.
5
 The approach outlined in this paper relates to Ostrom and associates’ Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (Ostrom 2005; McGinnis 2010) [and variants of it, e.g. the design prin-
ciples for sustainable management of common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990)]. See Kooiman et al. 
(2005) who also applies institutional analysis to fisheries governance.
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1. Their social organizational features: particular classes of designated agents, 
their roles and relations of power/authority, and procedures for making 
collective decisions.
2. Their normative-cognitive features: the definition of relevant or appropriate 
“problems” or “issues”, the goals or priorities relating to the problems and to 
favourable states of the world, conceptualization or models of sources of the 
problems, the causal linkages, and strategies and methods to solve problems 
or deal with issues.
The paradigms define, frame problems or problem situations, the “objects” that 
are to be shaped, produced, governed, or transformed. The distinctions between 
the two basic building blocks of governance systems – the social organizational 
configuration and the cognitive-normative configuration – are not just analytical 
ones. The important point to note regarding the different categories is that 
they exert different kinds of influence. Organization exerts a direct pressure 
Table 1: Elements comprising the architecture of a governance paradigm
Feature of the governance paradigm Explanation
Social organizational configuration
Authority and responsibility Actors with formal or informal responsibility for addressing 
and/or resolving key issues and problems
Expertise and knowledge requirements Actors that are legitimate knowledge sources and producers to 
explain sources and solutions of any particular issue 
Other affected actors, stakeholders Actors that are not directly part of the governance regime itself 
but are affected by it and/or try to influence it
Procedures for (legitimate)  
decision-making
Designation of persons with authority to make decisions or 
define who and how actors should be involved in a collective 
decision-making process 
Also includes deliberating, resolving or settling conflicts, and 
deciding the nature of the problem and the right strategy and 
solution
Cognitive-normative configuration
Problem or issue Framing and characterization of the key issues that the 
governance system is supposed to regulate
Goals and priorities Definition of legitimate values and appropriate goals 
which are expected to be applied in the policy-making and 
governing processes
Conceptualization/model of the 
situation or issues
The applied model(s) of the social arrangements, the natural 
or technological system and the interaction between them 
(which may or may not be correct)
Solutions Specification of form and range of acceptable methods 
to achieve the goals including the appropriate, available 
institutional practices, technologies and strategies
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influencing and regulating overt behaviour, while the influence that stems 
from the cognitive-normative configuration is conceptual and normative. In an 
instance where a policy paradigm is highly institutionalized, the two would be 
expected to mirror one another to a very large extent.6 In instances where the 
level of institutionalization is much lower, such as in periods of transition or 
confrontation over paradigmatic elements, one would expect many gaps and 
inconsistencies, as a new policy paradigm is constructed, struggled over, and 
reconstructed over time and space. 
2.2.2. Key factors in the functioning of governance systems
Governance systems are a type of social system. Social systems are characterized 
by institutional arrangements, organized forms of power, diverse knowledges and 
conflict/struggle within and over the systems (Burns 2006). Power, knowledge, 
and conflict are three key dimensions with which to explain a significant part of 
the functioning and transformation of governance systems. Briefly:
A. Power, different types of power including expert powers: 
Power and control are central to governance systems – both in their functioning 
but also in establishing or changing them. In their functioning, relations of 
authority and responsibility already have been singled out in our characterization 
of the architecture of governance systems. In general, the power arrangements 
of governance systems may vary greatly: there are hierarchical forms including 
bureaucratic and patron-client types of hierarchy, horizontal (for instance, 
negotiating orders run by a committee, board, or a network), “markets-like”, 
“democratic-like decision-making”, and a great variety of hybrids. McGinnis 
(2010, 6) also stresses that, in general, governance need not be conceptualized 
as authoritative agents having “power over” subjects or citizens, but can entail 
various forms of agents jointly exercising “power with others” in joint efforts 
to solve common problems or realize shared goals. Power may be backed by 
substantial economic or political resources, but increasingly there are various 
forms of “soft powers” (Carson et al. 2009). 
B. Knowledges: 
Governance systems typically entail knowledge acquisition and production 
processes evolving in concrete, practical ways, particularly those dealing with 
6
 For the application of the framework to describe the architecture of specific governance systems, 
one would usually reflect the institutionalized view of the most powerful actor (e.g. the EU in the 
cases in this paper). However, in governance systems with major cleavages or a low level of institu-
tionalization, the cognitive-normative and social organizational framework might significantly differ 
among different agents or groups of agents. One of the applications of the framework is to compare 
the different conceptions of an appropriate governance paradigm among different actors in order to 
identify and explicate sources of conflict that might lead to dysfunctioning and ultimately transfor-
mations of the governance system (Carson et al. 2009).
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objects or phenomena about which specialized (scientific and other) knowledge is 
believed to be essential to regulatory effectiveness. 
Because most governance arrangements consist of multiple regulatory 
mechanisms, diverse bodies of knowledge are required (for example, different 
scientific disciplines plus diverse stakeholders with their local or tacit knowledge). 
Together these increase the likelihood of effective policy-making and regulation. 
One of the aims of many governance arrangements is through the design of 
organizational forms and procedures to enable the systematic application of 
relevant knowledges to governance problems, for instance, local practical 
knowledge, scientific knowledge, knowledge of law (and, thus, sustainable 
in any challenge “according to the law”) etc. Indeed, one of the challenges 
in contemporary governance design is to effectivize legitimate procedures 
incorporating the increasing diversity of expertise as well as an increasing 
engagement of a variety of “relevant or appropriate stakeholders”. The results 
are complex governance arrangements as illustrated in the Baltic fisheries case 
presented later. By complexity we understand that the governance system is 
characterized by a high number of actors, relations and dependencies between 
them, regulatory processes, forms of knowledge and interests that are difficult to 
understand and coordinate, create non-linear dynamics and may therefore lead to 
unforeseen developments and outcomes of the governance system as such. 
C. Contestation/conflict: 
Governance systems typically entail multiple forms of power and regulatory 
processes, multiple agents (including different stakeholders), diverse forms of 
knowledge and interests among those involved and affected by such systems. 
This provides a context for contradiction and conflict. Since agents involved in 
government systems typically have differing roles as well as knowledge and 
interest bases and even varying conceptualizations of governance aims and 
arrangements – in short a differing cognitive-normative configuration, struggles 
take place about the social organizational elements including the proper 
architecture, functioning, and reform of governance. Those directly involved 
as well as those affected in one way or another are likely to be concerned about 
issues such as what are defined as problems, goals, preferred governance forms 
and procedures (public, private, hybrid, etc.), procedures for deciding what are 
“problems” or “solutions”, or what are strategies and methods to use in finding 
solutions. One of the challenges of modern governance systems is to coordinate 
and integrate the different regulatory mechanisms, diverse agents, and their 
differing material and ideal interests as well as differences in their governance 
conceptions. 
In sum, the paper proposed above a model of the architecture of governance 
systems – their major components and inter-linkages – which will be applied 
to selected cases in Parts II and III. The model contributes, as illustrated later, 
to increase comparability among cases and with the possibility of improved 
accumulation of knowledge about governance systems. 
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3. Multi-level, complex case of commons governance: Baltic 
fisheries
The Baltic Sea fisheries governance discussed in this section is an example of a 
complex, multi-level commons governance case that is still in a difficult “take off” 
phase, but where institutional analysis sheds some light on the problems and the 
direction reforms might take to increase effectiveness. Although fisheries belongs 
to the areas that Ostrom has also investigated, the degree of complexity goes 
beyond her classic work and thus points to her later contributions on polycentric 
and multi-level governance, that is more complex forms of governance (e.g. 
Ostrom 2009, 2010a,b). 
3.1. Background
The Baltic Sea is a comparatively small semi-enclosed sea of about 415,000 km2. It is 
bordered by nine countries7 with together about 16 million people living on the coast. 
With the exception of Russia, all bordering states are members of the European Union, 
with Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joining quite recently in 2004. The brackish 
water of the Baltic supports both marine and freshwater species. The most important 
commercially harvested fish species are cod, herring and sprat (herring-like fish used 
for, among other things, “sardines”) that make up about 90% of the total catches. 
Other economically relevant species are among others salmon and eel. Catches have 
increased over the past 50 years from 100,000 tons to over a million resulting in a value 
of catches of about 540 million EUR each year. The intensity and kind of fisheries vary 
between the different bordering states, as one can see in Table 2. 
The management of fishing activities in a sustainable manner has been one 
of the major governance challenges worldwide. Until recently, while the Baltic 
herring and sprat stocks have generally been in good condition, the two cod stocks 
(“Eastern” and “Western”) have decreased considerably and the situation has been 
especially dramatic for the Eastern cod stock. 
Table 2: Reported landings in tons by country in the Baltic Sea region 2006 (data taken from 
http://www.seaaroundus.org/sponsor/baltic.aspx)
Denmark Poland Sweden Germany Finland Latvia Estonia Russia Lithuania Total
Cod 32,300 70,084 17,643 14,920 989 9139 1303 6583 7347 160,306
Herring 9482 52,482 79,400 30,667 97,932 27,198 29,114 11,456 1413 339,144
Sprat 51,051 65,257 79,349 35,938 23,334 63,795 56,072 33,071 12,626 420,483
Other 
species
40,395 20,334 8210 8033 14,587 2920 3338 7447 833 106,108
Total 133,228 208,157 184,602 89,558 136,842 103,052 89,827 58,557 22,219 1,026,041
7
 EU member states of Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
and the non-EU Russia.
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3.2. The EU fisheries governance system8 
3.2.1. Regulation and authority
The EU countries agreed in 1983 on the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). With 
about 2000 rules, it is one of the most comprehensive fisheries governance 
agreements world-wide regulating all aspects of fishing.9 In this governance 
system, the EU Council of Ministers is the highest decision-maker determining 
broad policy measures that are to be implemented by the member-state Fishing 
Ministries. The most important determination is the annual total allowable catches 
(TACs), which are distributed among the member states according to the “principle 
of relative stability”.10 The European Commission (more precisely, DG Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries, DG MARE) prepares and proposes the regulations for the 
Council. The Council together with the EU Parliament are the main co-deciders 
of legislation and policy (Carson et al. 2009).11 
3.2.2. Expertise and knowledge requirements
Although the regulatory power is concentrated at the EU level, the decisions 
are informed by several knowledge sources. Among the four most significant 
advisory groups two groups consist of scientists and two of stakeholders. Most 
importantly are scientific studies and measurements about the status and the future 
development of the fish stocks. However, unlike in forestry or agriculture, fish 
resources are moving targets and difficult to observe under water.12 The interactions 
of different species with each other and other components of the eco-system are 
still not fully understood. In addition, the regional conditions vary tremendously. 
Thus scientific knowledge acquisition and production processes about the object 
of governance – the fish stocks – are costly, often provide uncertain information 
and are confronted with ecological conditions that change over time. The most 
important knowledge source for EU fisheries policy is arguably the International 
8
 This case study is using data that have been generated through a project with the Baltic Sea Region-
al Advisory Council (BS RAC). Besides the reviewed literature, we rely on data gathered through 
more than 30 qualitative interviews with different BS RAC members, scientists and the European 
Commission, observations of BS RAC meetings and numerous informal talks.
We only consider key parts of the regulation of the Baltic fisheries. There are numerous other regula-
tory processes taking place that affect the environmental and health of the fish (as well as humans) 
relating to control of waste disposals, effluents that are or might be dumped into the Baltic. 
9
 It sets catch quotas of each type of fish each member state is allowed to catch. The CFP transferred 
substantial power from the member-state level to the EU level and member states have only limited 
leeway for national regulations, for example, coastal and inland fisheries. Enforcement is the respon-
sibility of member states, but there is a community level inspection service to ensure that member 
states enforce the rules within their own country. 
10
 Relative stability is the permanent share for each member states, usually defined through historic 
catch records.
11
 Thus far the European Parliament is only consulted but does not have any regulative power in the 
matter of fisheries. However, this is going to change to the co-decision modality engaging the Coun-
cil and the Parliament after the next reform of the CFP 2012.
12
 See e.g. Schlager et al. (1994) on fish as mobile CPR units and its effects on harvesters.
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Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), an umbrella organization for the 
national research institutes, where the data collected on status and prognosis of 
fish stocks are organized and interpreted. Based on the data obtained and the 
application of the precautionary principle,13 ICES provides recommendations for 
policy measures of which the annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is the most 
important (Commission 2007; Karagiannakos 1996). In addition, the Commission 
established the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries 
(STECF) in 1993 and renewed it in 2005. The Committee consists of scientists 
that provide advice on the current status of fisheries resources, their development 
and any consequent economic implications. 
The second source of information comes from stakeholders that, especially 
in the recent years, have gained greater opportunities to provide advice to the 
European Commission. One stakeholder-based advisory group is the Advisory 
Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) that consists of members of the 
fishing industry and since 2000 also of scientists and NGOs. The Commission 
typically asks the Committee for advice concerning certain issues related to the 
CFP, but ACFA can also issue its own opinions. In addition, after continuous 
pressure from the fishing industry and with the general shift of the EU governance 
paradigm towards greater inclusiveness with increased stakeholder involvement, 
the Council decided in the CFP reform 2002 to set up Regional Advisory Councils 
(RACs) that consist of representatives of the fishing sector and so called “other 
interest” groups that among others include environmental Non-Government 
Organizations (ENGOs). Similarly to ACFA, the RACs provide – preferably 
consensus based – advice to the Commission on behalf of their region, but do not 
have any formal regulatory power.
3.2.3. Other affected actors, stakeholders
At the grassroots level, two main groups of stakeholders have an interest in 
fisheries governance – the fishing industry (e.g. fishers, ship owners, processing 
industry) and ENGOs. The fishing industry tries to realize economic gains from 
fishing. The scope and size of fisheries are highly diverse; different national legal 
and norm systems apply in the fishing communities; and responsible authorities 
and configurations of actors vary among the countries (see later). 
ENGOs promote nature conservation and obtain their influence mainly 
through private campaigns to mobilize public opinion, consumer behaviour, and 
even electoral results. The power and size of ENGOs vary among countries as 
well. In Sweden for example, ENGOs were able to block the entire Baltic cod 
market after practices of unsustainable harvesting were disclosed. In Poland, on 
the other hand, ENGOs still play a marginal role in Baltic Sea policy-making 
processes.
13
 The Precautionary Approach states that “The absence of adequate scientific information should 
not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures” 
(FAO 1995, 12).
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Figure 1 summarizes the governance system described above. Although it can 
be classified as a hierarchical paradigm it consists of multiple levels (EU, regional, 
national, local) and a large number of different actors with a wide spectrum of 
interests, diverse powers, and different organizational arrangements. 
3.3. The architecture of Baltic Sea fisheries governance 
Using the analytic scheme presented in the first part of this paper, the different 
elements comprising the architecture of the Baltic fisheries governance system 
can be specified (Table 3). Such an approach allows, as we suggest later, 
comparisons with other governance cases but also enables one to analyze and 
identify shifts in the current governance systems leading to institutional change 
(Carson et al. 2009).
This governance configuration is the conception from the perspective of, and 
favoured by, the European Union. The EU is by far the most powerful formal 
agent (actually a group of agents) articulated through the DG Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries at the Commission. However, other actors, both subjects and third 
parties such as the ENGOs prefer other governance paradigms based on different 
Figure 1: The EU fisheries governance process.
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organizational forms and different goals, and with different conceptualizations 
and models of problems and solutions as well as proper knowledge sources. 
The framework can be used to identify these differences in both the preferred 
organizational as well as the cognitive normative configuration as sources of 
potential conflicts and instabilities:
A. Social organization configuration
Authority and Responsibility:
Besides some fishermen that argue that there should be no regulation or only self-
regulation it is generally accepted that there is a need for international regulative 
body. However, the level of power of the council is challenged both by fishers and 
ENGOs (see procedures for decision-making). 
Expertise and knowledge requirements:
Many actors from the industry also challenge the designated expertise and 
knowledge requirements in the current governance system. Instead of marine 
biologists as the dominating provider of scientific knowledge they promote a 
greater inclusion of socio-economic expertise as well as fishers’ knowledge into 
the decision-making process. While many ENGOs do not deny the need for 
fisher’s knowledge in general, they tend to strongly argue for scientific data as the 
decisive element.
Procedures for decision-making:
The fishing industry has an interest in gaining substantial influence over regulatory 
decisions and, in general, promotes greater inclusion of fisheries stakeholders into 
the governance process. Instead of the EU conception of a top-level decision-
making body and the big influence of scientists, the fishing industry promotes the 
idea of a system of stronger self-regulation for the fishing industry. Also, NGOs 
appear to be against the Council as highest decision-making body (see later) and 
would prefer to give more decision-making power to the Commission level and/
or scientists.
Many of these differences in views about how the social organization of 
fisheries governance should be structured relate to the agents’ particular cognitive-
normative configurations:
B. Cognitive-normative configuration: 
Goals and priorities:
Fishers and the fishing industry consider the protection of the fish stock as less an 
issue and a goal than the maintenance of a healthy fishing industry; both of these 
goals are important to the EU, but pose a greater dilemma for them than for fishers 
and the fishing industry. For ENGOs on the other hand the primary goal would 
appear to be fish population sustainability and a reduction of the fishing pressure; 
the goal of maintaining a healthy fishing industry appears as less relevant from 
their perspective. 
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Conceptualization/model of the situation or issues:
Some fishers also have a different causality model than the EU and would argue 
that the interaction between the different (natural) factors within the ecosystem 
(such as multi-species interactions) as well as external natural factors (such 
as climate change and the change in water temperature) have a much greater 
influence on fish stocks than fishing activity as such. ENGOs usually support the 
causal models of the EU.
Solutions:
As a consequence of differing goals and conceptualizations, fisheries stakeholders 
also tend to contest the catch quotas in the form of TACs – both in terms of the 
concrete quotas as well as the TAC system as an appropriate solution itself. While 
generally accepting the applied solutions of the EU, ENGOs tend to perceive the 
current system as too supportive of the fishing industry and not attentive enough 
to their environmental concerns. 
The differing goals (socio-economic rationality versus environmental 
concerns) in this configuration of agents reflect the fundamental conflict 
that the CFP governance system is faced with, while trying to realize both 
goals. However, such conflicts are rather common in other environmental 
governance arenas and do not necessary lead to a collapse or non-functioning 
of the governance system. Nevertheless, some of those engaged in the system 
might try to mobilize powers to either achieve a shift of the current governance 
system or to fully sabotage it. Depending on the powers that these actors are 
able to mobilize, such efforts can be successful in such a way that a shift in 
governance arrangements is achieved or that the governance system fails 
altogether. In the case of Baltic Sea governance both scenarios can be seen 
developing. As we will outline in the next sub-section, the essential top-down 
regulatory system has not succeeded in achieving compliance by those most 
affected – the fishers.
3.4. Key struggles and their explanation
The Baltic Sea governance system has not prevented the overexploitation of fish 
stocks in recent years, as indicated earlier. The non-compliance by many fishers 
reflected in large part the weak legitimacy and enforcement of CFP regulations. 
ICES has estimated that the illegal, unregulated or unreported (IUU) fishing 
consists of 30–40% of the total landings. According to a recent study by Rossing 
et al. (2010) the greatest offenders are Poland, Sweden and Denmark that are 
also the countries with the largest share of TACs. Poland represents a whole 
36% of the total IUU, while Sweden and Denmark represent 13% and 14%. The 
estimated IUU for cod in Poland reaches in some years 300% of the reported 
cod landings. Although these data have to be treated with caution due to the 
difficult conditions of collecting them, they suggest the likely ineffectiveness 
of the present governance system as a whole. Cod stocks remain a major issue 
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of discussion and conflict, although recent indications suggest some signs of 
recovery.
Below we identify several key issues and conflicts which challenge the 
governance system. The discussion follows the focus of this paper on the role of 
power, knowledge and conflict in governance systems.
A. Problems related to power and enforcement in multi-level governance  
in a complex political context
1. Decisions about regulations for the Baltic Sea in the EU Council are negotiated 
among the ministers of all EU members – even from non-coastal states. 
This creates a situation, where outsiders and “amateurs” may be involved in 
deciding about basic fisheries issues including very technical questions such 
as appropriate mesh sizes, a case of misused power.14
2. The national systems around the Baltic differ significantly in their national 
legislation and political cultures. Although the influence of the national 
states is becoming weaker due to power shifts to the transnational as 
well as increasingly to sub-national levels (Symes 2007), they still play 
an important role in the allocation of TACs. Countries like Sweden can 
be described as a neo-corporatist and inclusive society, which is reflected 
in fisheries policies (e.g. the Swedish co-management initiative) and 
strong fisher associations.15 Four of the EU countries bordering the Baltic 
belong to the former communist Eastern block and joined the EU only 
recently (2004). This process led to a severe destabilization of the fishing 
industry in these countries. In Poland, for example, local and regional 
fisher organizations hardly exist. A unifying voice in policy formation is 
therefore missing. The so-called “mazonerias” that managed fisheries as 
local, co-operative organizations in the command economy before 1991 
have almost completely disappeared. Along with these institutions, the 
cultural norms of localized collaboration and mutual help vanished as well. 
In their place emerged an ideology of pure self-interested behaviour on the 
part of individual fishers and minimal legitimacy attributed to coordinating, 
regulating institutions (Marciniak and Jentoft 1997, 84).
3. Standardized regulations collide sometimes with particularities in a 
region. The rule to discard “good fish” and return them to the sea in mixed 
14
 In general, electoral politics in the Baltic member-states lead to trade offs in the negotiation pro-
cess that have little to do with the problems of fisheries as such. Final regulations therefore are often 
delayed, only partially implemented or deviate both from the Commission’s proposals as well as 
scientific guidelines (Daw and Gray 2005). For example, Council decisions on TACs in 2006 were 
on the average 45% higher than the catches recommended by ICES (Aps et al. 2007). 
15
 Denmark adheres also to corporatist fisheries governance with a strong fisher association as an 
umbrella for various smaller associations. 
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fishery situations provides a much discussed example. While discards 
are generally considered as undesirable, in some Baltic regions, cod, for 
example, has appeared in traditional areas of herring or sprat. The boats 
that are fishing there do not have allotted cod quotas. Therefore, the fishers 
are supposed to discard the cod that they catch together with the sprat or 
herring, but do not always do so contributing to the high level of IUU 
catches.
B. Problems relating to the knowledge bases for fisheries management:
1. There are high levels of uncertainty in the ICES assessments due, for 
example, to random fluctuations in the fish stock characteristics or the 
poor understanding of the interactions within the eco-system that influence 
fish population behaviour and development. In addition, the scope of 
scientific assessments is very limited, since it mostly relies on single-
species assessments, ignoring (or ignorant of) multi-species and eco-system 
conditions (Daw and Gray 2005).
2. At the same time, the European Commission relies almost exclusively on 
scientific knowledge, in particular the ICES. In general, the EU has not 
been able to incorporate effectively fishers’ knowledge into the scientific 
or regulatory process (including data about IUU). For example, in the 2008 
advice on sprat, ICES had a problem with the survey area since the stock 
had moved. In the discussions in the Baltic Sea Regional Advisory Council 
between fishers and scientists, it turned out that the sprat fishers knew 
already three months earlier that the distribution area had changed (Stöhr 
and Chabay 2010). 
Problems of incorporating fishers knowledge into the scientific advisory 
process can be traced to: (a) the difficulties of integrating the tacit and 
qualitative information of fishers into the quantitative scientific models; (b) 
the institutional multi-level structure of the scientific advisory process itself 
(since the data are collected by the national research institutes and have to 
be aggregated, organized and turned into political advice on an international 
level); and (c) the mutual strong skepticism and distrust between scientists 
and fishers. 
3. The legislative and bureaucratic mandates for science in a regulatory 
environment tend to constrain and distort science and scientific 
recommendations. The need to translate scientific data into policy 
recommendations leads to “creative tensions” (Wilson 2009) within ICES 
and pressures to achieve an artificial consensus among the scientists. In 
addition, there is an incentive for scientists to provide overly conservative 
recommendations in order to try to pre-empt political compromise (Daw 
and Gray 2005; Stöhr and Chabay 2010).
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C. Stakeholder and challenger issues and contestations
1. Participatory mechanisms such as the RAC are restricted to purely advisory 
functions while decisions about formal regulations – even in questions of 
micromanagement – are made by the EU. The members of the Baltic Sea 
RAC have repeatedly pointed at the poor recognition and incorporation of 
the stakeholder advice into the policy process. One of many examples is the 
Commission’s consultation process about a new regulation on “Technical 
Measures”, where the chairmen of the RACs expressed their dissatisfaction in 
a joint letter (Johansson et al. 2009).
2. Different value systems and problem definitions applied by different 
stakeholders lead to conflicts (especially fishers and NGOs but also 
between different nationalities) and make consensus in the RAC 
deliberations in critical matters unlikely. The most prominent example is 
the annual Baltic Sea RAC advice on TACs to the European Commission, 
where the discussions regularly heat up. ENGOs tend to follow the TACs 
recommended by the scientists of ICES as “the best available information” 
applied following the precautionary principle.16 Fishers, on the other hand, 
tend to see the ICES recommendations as a point of departure that have 
to be put in perspective according to uncertainties in the data and socio-
economic considerations. 
3. The dialogue and consensus making processes within the regulative system 
(RACs) are undermined by external activities and measures of the stakeholders 
(e.g. campaigns, lobbying). The success of Swedish ENGOs with their public 
campaign against cod consumption (see above) led repeatedly to very heated 
discussions in the RAC meetings. Fishers argued that such campaigns are 
irresponsible courses of action that threaten a whole industry and the livelihood 
of many fishers. 
These points illustrate, among other things, the difficulties that attempts to increase 
stakeholder engagement in the Baltic fisheries have faced. For the European 
Commission, greater inclusion of stakeholders and stakeholder knowledge is 
connected with the hope for more legitimacy and acceptance of policy decisions 
and higher compliance among fishers. 
3.5. Discussion
Several of the factors identified in section I appear prominently in the Baltic fisheries 
case: (1) there is the central role of power and contradictory power arrangements: 
the “state power” of the EU Commission, the powers in a multi-level system of 
member states, grassroots powers (and the power mobilization of groups of ENGOs), 
16
 In ICES giving advice on TACs, it reduces TAC levels to take into account the scientific uncer-
tainty in the data, in accordance with the precautionary principle (see footnote 14).
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and the power of experts. In our case study the Commission enjoyed substantial 
power in setting up and managing the institutional arrangement of the fisheries 
governance system but lacked sufficient power over key member states and their 
fishing interests to regulate effectively fishing behaviour.17 (2) While expertise is 
central in the fisheries case, there have been substantial problems in mobilizing and 
integrating different kinds of knowledge and applying them coherently in the policy 
process – a result of the limitations of the current social organization of the system. 
(3) Contestation and non-compliance characterize the governance system.18
There have been – and continue to be – efforts to improve the effectiveness 
of the EU Baltic fisheries governance system, a process of groping ahead, which 
is likely to continue for some time (this slow, piecemeal process is typical in the 
formation of complex governance systems). The next CFP reform proposal is soon 
due. The Green paper “Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy” acknowledges 
that the existing top-down structure of the fisheries governance process provides 
few incentives for the fishers to behave responsibly (Commission 2009). It also 
raises the question of how to incorporate stakeholder knowledge in the research-
based advice and policy-making. It even promotes the idea of “industry self-
management”. This suggests a possible paradigm shift in governance towards 
regionalization and stakeholder involvement.
Ostrom and others argue strongly for such a shift. The design principles in her 
classic work “Governing the Commons” (Ostrom 1990) outline the conditions 
under which, localized CPR self-management is likely to be successful. Her 
later work on polycentric systems takes this approach and applies it to larger 
governance regimes with multiple levels (Ostrom 2005, 2010b). The two main 
advantages of smaller, rather autonomous systems are that firstly, they are less 
complex and thus easier to manipulate and adapt than the overall system with 
a centralized authority. Secondly, the dissonances in the cognitive-normative 
configurations between the authorities and the fishers (see Table 3) are likely to 
be reduced, which is both conditioned by and resulting in the evolution of local 
norms, compliance and trust. Or, as Ostrom puts it:
“Polycentric systems tend to enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, 
trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement 
of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales.” 
(Ostrom 2010b, 552)
17
 While member-states ministries, the fishing industry and a number of stakeholders, particularly 
ENGOs, possessed some countervailing powers, they were not sufficient to overthrow the established 
hierarchy and to set up an entirely new paradigm of governance, for instance, a “negotiating order”, 
a polycentric system of governance with overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) (Ostrom 
2009; McGinnis 2010:6), or a polyarchy with very local units having authority and responsibility to 
run their own operations (that is a self-regulation regime). 
18
 The legitimacy of both the scientific expertise as well as the governance system itself on the grass-
root level have been major issues reinforcing contestation and non-cooperative behavior, generally. 
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However, greater empowerment of stakeholders may not provide the ultimate 
solution per se. It can also amplify conflicts. Fishers and ENGOs look back on a 
history of conflicts. Stöhr and Chabay (2010) show, for example, that fishers in the 
Baltic Sea use the platform of the Baltic Sea RAC to attack scientific knowledge 
claims and to carry this conflict into the governance process. Similar results are 
indicated for the North Sea fisheries (Griffin 2009).
The anticipated changes in the CFP towards more participation can be seen as a 
shift from the earlier pure top-down governance paradigm towards more inclusion, 
a development that has been pushed by the fishing industry. While the ongoing 
reforms in the governance system have been more or less marginal, indications are 
that the CFP reform 2012 is likely to move much further in this direction.
4. Elaboration: comparative analysis of governance systems
After crafting an analytical framework and applying it to the Baltic fisheries multi-
level governance case through which one could illustrate that the framework 
facilitates an understanding of several relevant governance phenomena, we 
present in this section a few elaborations which suggest the usefulness of this 
particular institutional approach. 
Going beyond the accumulation of numerous case studies, we draw on 
other governance cases we have investigated in the EU, in particular chemicals 
and gender, and show how their architectures can each be specified and made 
comparable to the Baltic fisheries case on the finite set of dimensions. The following 
table (Table 4) applies these key dimensions to all three cases. This approach 
enables comparisons of the social organization of governance, those agents having 
responsibility and exercising authority, the expert groups and networks serving 
the governance system, the problem or issue motivating regulation, the key goals 
of the system and the models and methods used in monitoring and regulating.
Briefly about the two additional EU governance areas19 (see Carson et al. 2009 
for more details):
First, EU chemical governance entailed a radical regime of regulation passed 
in 2006: Registration, evaluation, authorization, and restriction of chemicals 
(REACH). It has been designed to cover a major part of all chemicals (substances 
of either high concern or manufactured or imported over 1000 tonnes). The law 
replaced about 40 legislative instruments in force at the time. The European 
Chemical Agency (ECHA) was established in 2007. Thousands of substances 
(approx. 30,000 expected) already on the market are being assessed and will be 
subject to authorization. The burden of proof of chemical safety lies now with the 
producers, not with consumers or with the regulator. Chemicals can be banned – 
or if their value to society is judged to be very high they can be allowed but under 
very tight controls. REACH – in effect since June, 2007 – was one of the most 
19
 The establishments of these systems are instances of the exercise of meta- or structural power in 
agent-driven innovation and transformation of governance (Carson et al. 2009).
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shift from the earlier pure top-down governance paradigm towards more inclusion, 
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reforms in the governance system have been more or less marginal, indications are 
that the CFP reform 2012 is likely to move much further in this direction.
4. Elaboration: comparative analysis of governance systems
After crafting an analytical framework and applying it to the Baltic fisheries multi-
level governance case through which one could illustrate that the framework 
facilitates an understanding of several relevant governance phenomena, we 
present in this section a few elaborations which suggest the usefulness of this 
particular institutional approach. 
Going beyond the accumulation of numerous case studies, we draw on 
other governance cases we have investigated in the EU, in particular chemicals 
and gender, and show how their architectures can each be specified and made 
comparable to the Baltic fisheries case on the finite set of dimensions. The following 
table (Table 4) applies these key dimensions to all three cases. This approach 
enables comparisons of the social organization of governance, those agents having 
responsibility and exercising authority, the expert groups and networks serving 
the governance system, the problem or issue motivating regulation, the key goals 
of the system and the models and methods used in monitoring and regulating.
Briefly about the two additional EU governance areas19 (see Carson et al. 2009 
for more details):
First, EU chemical governance entailed a radical regime of regulation passed 
in 2006: Registration, evaluation, authorization, and restriction of chemicals 
(REACH). It has been designed to cover a major part of all chemicals (substances 
of either high concern or manufactured or imported over 1000 tonnes). The law 
replaced about 40 legislative instruments in force at the time. The European 
Chemical Agency (ECHA) was established in 2007. Thousands of substances 
(approx. 30,000 expected) already on the market are being assessed and will be 
subject to authorization. The burden of proof of chemical safety lies now with the 
producers, not with consumers or with the regulator. Chemicals can be banned – 
or if their value to society is judged to be very high they can be allowed but under 
very tight controls. REACH – in effect since June, 2007 – was one of the most 
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radical and contentious policy initiatives of the EU, involving almost 10 years 
of debate, mobilization, struggle, and negotiations between the Commission, 
the Council of the European Union, the Parliament, and industry, labour unions, 
environmental, consumer and animal rights NGOs, among others. In addition, 
there were substantial cleavages and struggles within EU institutions: in Parliament 
(between, for instance, the Committee on Environment and Committees on 
Industry and Legal Affairs); in the Commission (between DG Environment and 
DG Enterprise), and in the Council itself between the countries (in particular 
Germany, France, UK) fighting to defend the old paradigm of a privileged position 
and limited regulation for the chemical industry and those states pushing for a 
new, much tougher regime of chemical regulation (for instance, Sweden, Austria, 
Finland, and Denmark). The US Government and US companies were key players 
in these struggles. Arguably, never has a public policy process in the EU involved 
so many players with such intensity over such a long period of time. 
Second, the aim of EU gender governance was to “eliminate inequalities and 
to promote equality between men and women – and to do this in all EU policy 
sectors, a policy principle referred to as “mainstreaming” (established in 2000). 
The scope of the development is suggested by such sectors as “women in science,” 
“their role in structural funds,” “EU development aid, reconciliation between work 
and private life,” “women in societal decision-making,” “domestic violence,” etc.
The EU came to make gender equality a core public policy goal during the 
1990s. The EU approach evolved over three decades from, on the one hand, its 
previous approach that limited the issue to only the labour market to, on the other 
hand, an extensive approach that considers gender relations in a much broader 
public perspective (Hoskyns 2000, 3). The multiple “parallel tracks” concept in 
the evolution of EU gender equality policy has been driven from “below” and 
“above”. National and international women activists and organizations have 
nudged EU policy along through periods of relative inactivity or painfully slow 
progress punctuated by occasional surges forward – a process of fits and starts that 
resembles the evolution of the EU itself. At the same time, it has been facilitated 
by contemporaneous developments within individual member states and at the 
international level – driven in large part by women’s activism. 
These developments were nurtured and driven forward by an array of local, 
national, and EU-level actors: women’s organizations and other sympathetic 
NGOs, officials within the European Commission, members of the European 
Parliament, and civil servants and officials within several Member States. 
Moreover, international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO) have been important sources of influence.
Several immediate observations from Table 4:
1. Contradictory goals characterize fisheries and chemicals: there is to be control 
over fishing and chemicals, respectively, but also these very industries are to 
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be maintained and developed as economically valuable. On the other hand, 
there are no conflicting goals concerning gender equality at the policy level; 
however, on a practical level, that is the level of implementation, there are of 
course other goals such as avoiding disruption of established practices that 
play a role and compete for priority with gender equality.
2. Fisheries and Chemicals are governed through specialized Commission 
directorates within the established EU institutional arrangements. Gender 
policy is not associated with a new and separate agency. However, special 
gender equality units and programs were set up in DG Research, DG 
Development, DG Europe AID, DG for Justice, Freedom and Security;20 and 
an established unit DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 
(DG-ESAEO) has been expanded for the purpose of coordination in the gender 
equality area.
3. New special EU agencies of expertise have been created for chemicals, 
ECHA, respectively. A partial “Europeanization” of expertise can also be 
seen in the case of the Baltic fisheries governance with the establishment of 
the ICES. On the other hand, no specialized unit of expertise was established 
for gender.21
As might be expected in these EU cases, the types of expertise and knowledge 
requirements vary considerably. However, all have substantial involvement 
of scientists, but natural scientists predominate in chemicals, and to great 
extent fisheries, while social scientists including criminologists are engaged 
in the gender area. At the same time, non-expert types of knowledge 
brokers have become predominant in these EU governance settings. In 
fisheries governance, as we have seen, there have been conflicts, and the 
integration of the different knowledge agents has not been accomplished 
thus far. Fisheries governance is also weakest in terms of multi-stakeholder 
participation in deliberations and policy-making (although such participation 
is an established normative idea in the EU); nonetheless, there are currently 
initiatives to correct this.
4. The models of the problems and their mechanisms (or causes) differ 
accordingly. Baltic fishing is a classic commons problem (a potential “tragedy 
of the commons”). Chemicals had come to be identified as major problems as 
the result of a long history of introducing thousands of chemicals into society 
without adequate testing or knowledge about the human and environmental 
20
 The DG for Justice, Freedom, and Security has been divided into two DGs in 2010: the DG for 
Home Affairs and the DG for Justice (the latter consisting of three directorates: Civil Justice, Crimi-
nal Justice, and Fundamental Rights and Citizenship). 
21
 There is, of course, a unit in DG ESAEO and gender coordinators in the different DGs (most DGs 
do not have gender units but officers that act as gender coordinators). Some of these bodies are the 
Advisory Committee on equal opportunities for women and men (created in 1981), the Commission 
Inter-Service Group on Gender Mainstreaming (created in 1996), and the European Institute for 
Gender Equality (established in 2007). We are grateful to Dolores Gomez Calvo for these details (see 
also Carson et al. 2009). 
The case of EU Baltic fisheries 255
health risks. Gender inequality and discrimination – in the context of 
expanding democratic norms and practices – called for new actions and policy 
responses. There were major differences among member-states in addressing 
gender issues, but some issues such as violence against women were shown 
through European research to be largely neglected everywhere. This and other 
policy considerations – in the context of feminist research and rhetoric about 
systematic structural discrimination in all societies – set the stage for the EU 
“mainstreaming initiative” (Carson et al. 2009).
5. The “solutions” in the different governance areas vary greatly. In some areas, 
“strong sanctions” are absent (or they are easily circumvented or subverted) 
as in the case of fisheries. In the area of chemicals, strong sanctions have 
been established: Heavy fines can be imposed; products can even be banned 
from EU markets. In the gender area, contrary to some prognoses about a 
“toothless policy”, the EU found it had considerable leverage in areas such as 
science funding (DG Research) and structural funds (DG Regional Policy), 
where it became very unlikely for projects to obtain EU funding without 
demonstration of gender equalization among applicants. Even in the area 
of violence against women and children, the EU has supported widespread 
monitoring and financing of national efforts, which had a significant impact 
on public awareness and national and international policy during the course of 
the 1990s and 2000s.
In sum, the scheme of governance architecture provides a tool with which to 
comparatively describe and analyze governance systems on a few theoretically 
grounded dimensions. Different types of systems can be distinguished in these 
terms, for instance, the extent to which the goal structure is characterized by 
dilemmas, or the extent to which methods of regulation are characterized by single-
sector or multi-sector operations, or by “hard” or “soft” methods of regulation. 
The cases in Table 4 have been presented as monolithic governance systems but 
major cleavages between involved groups (for example, the EU and the fishers or 
ENGOs) articulated in their perspectives or paradigms can be represented in the 
framework and similarities and differences with the formal system identified and 
analyzed (see footnote 6).
5. Conclusions
The work presented in this article can be understood as a contribution to the 
new institutionalism. This is a major feature of contemporary interdisciplinarity 
among the social sciences, to which Elinor Ostrom and her associates have 
made substantial contributions through the development of the IAD framework 
and its application, in particular, to governance phenomena (see footnotes 3 
and 5). As illustrated here, a full-fledged institutional approach can address all 
levels of governance, including dealing with multi-level, complex governance 
systems. 
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Power, knowledge, values, and struggle are key factors in governance [and 
also in the transformation of governance systems (Carson et al. 2009)]; utilizing 
an institutional approach, we have investigated dimensions of power, knowledge, 
and conflict in governance systems. (1) The article considered powers within a 
governance system, for instance, the operative powers (and their limitations) over 
different agents and objects, as in the fisheries case but also the monitoring and 
sanctioning established in the chemicals and gender equality sectors. (2) While 
factors of information and knowledge are important in any institutional analysis, 
particular emphasis was put in this article on multiple knowledges of different groups 
of actors, for instance in the Baltic fisheries case the state agents that constituted the 
hegemonic governance paradigm in the first place, professional groups of experts, 
and the local, often tacit knowledge and models of “users” or subjects. (3) Given the 
multiple, diverse agents, with their differing knowledge perspectives and material 
and ideal interests with respect to governance, governance systems are characterized 
typically by internal and external contestation and conflict, which drive the exercise 
of power and, under some conditions, result in transformation of governance systems 
(Carson et al. 2009).
The process of conducting case studies on governance in diverse sectors 
and on multiple levels and assembling them, and using them as an empirical 
base for theoretical development is essential to cumulative science and to 
strengthening the inter-disciplinarity of an institutional approach. At the same 
time, this article has suggested that there is a need for the type of systematic 
comparative framework and analysis based on a few key dimensions 
(dimensions that nonetheless are highly context sensitive) which have been 
presented and applied here. The model of governance architecture facilitates 
the identification and analysis of similarities and differences among governance 
systems and promises to improve the accumulation of systematic knowledge 
about governance.
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